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Abstract
This paper describes work in continuous reasoning, where
formal reasoning about a (changing) codebase is done in a
fashion which mirrors the iterative, continuous model of
software development that is increasingly practiced in indus-
try. We suggest that advances in continuous reasoning will
allow formal reasoning to scale to more programs, and more
programmers. The paper describes the rationale for contin-
uous reasoning, outlines some success cases from within
industry, and proposes directions for work by the scientific
community.
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1 Introduction
An increasing trend in software engineering is the practice
of continuous development, where a number of programmers
work together sending, sometimes concurrent, updates to a
shared codebase [35, 36]. The code is not viewed as a fixed ar-
tifact implementing a finished product, but continues evolv-
ing. In some organizations a codebase in the millions of lines
can undergo rapid modification by thousands of program-
mers. Their work is often backed by a continuous integration
system (CI system) which ensures that the code continues to
be buildable, and that certain tests pass, as the code evolves.
CI-backed development extends and automates aspects of
prior informal practice [50]. People naturally develop pro-
grams in an iterative style, where coding and testing feed
back on design, and so on. The iterative model of software
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development can be contrasted with the waterfall model –
where one proceeds successively from requirements to de-
sign, implementation, testing and deployment. Of course,
the way that humans construct proofs has iterative aspects
as well; e.g., trying to develop a proof of a mathematical the-
orem can cause one to update the statement of the theorem,
try to prove and use a different lemma, etc.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that significant
benefits could accrue if formal reasoning about code can
be done in an automatic continuous fashion which mirrors
the iterative, continuous model of software development.
Then, formal reasoning could more easily scale to many pro-
grams and many programmers. Continuous reasoning views
a codebase as a changing artifact that evolves throughmodifi-
cations submitted by programmers. Continuous reasoning is
done quickly with the code changes, and feeds back informa-
tion to programmers in tune with their workflow rather than
outside of it. To be effective a reasoning technique ideally
should scale to a large codebase (sometimes in the millions
of lines of code), but run quickly on code modifications (on
the order of low tens of minutes). Then, it can participate as
a bot in the code review system that often accompanies CI.
This paper describes context for work on continuous rea-
soning, but does not set out to be a comprehensive survey.
We have seen continuous reasoning deployed industrially
in ways that have significantly boosted impact; we mention
several of the prominent cases in the next section, and then
attempt a synthesis. This paper draws on experience work-
ing with the Infer program analysis platform at Facebook,
and we describe that experience and generalize from it. The
purpose of the paper, however, is not to mainly recount what
we have done at Facebook; it is rather to connect a number
of related developments, as well as to tell you some of the
things we don’t know. We believe that there is much more
that can be done with continuous formal reasoning, that can
benefit the research community (in the form of challeng-
ing and relevant problems) as well as software development
practice (through wider impact of reasoning tools).
2 Continuous Reasoning
Rather than attempt a general definition of continuous rea-
soning, we start with examples. As this paper draws on our
experience at Facebook, it is natural to start there. Then we
mention relevant work from the scientific literature, as well
as experiences from other companies. Finally, we summarize
key aspects of continuous reasoning along with its rationale.
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Figure 1. Continuous Development
2.1 Facebook Infer
Deployment Infer is a static analysis tool applied to Java,
Objective C and C++ code at Facebook [7, 8]. It uses inter-
procedural analysis, yet scales to large code.
Facebook practices continuous software development where
a codebase is altered by thousands of programmers submit-
ting ‘diffs’, or code modifications. A programmer prepares a
diff and submits it to code review. Infer participates in this
workflow as a bot, writing comments for the programmer
and other human reviewers to consider. Figure 1 shows a
simplified picture of this process. The developers share ac-
cess to a single codebase and they land, or commit, a diff to
the codebase after passing code review. Infer is run at diff
time, before land, while longer-running perf and other tests
are run post land.
When a diff is submitted an instance of Infer is run in
Facebook’s internal CI system (Sandcastle). Infer does not
need to process the entire code base in order to analyze a
diff, and so is fast. Typically, Infer will take 10-15mins to
run on a diff, and this includes time to check out the source
repository, to build the diff, and to run on base and (possibly)
parent commits. Infer then writes comments to the code
review system1. The fast reporting is essential to keep in
tune with developers’ workflows. In contrast, when Infer is
run in whole-program mode it can take more than an hour
(depending on the app being analyzed). This would be too
slow for diff-time reporting.
Foundation: Automatic Compositonality The technical
feature which enables Infer’s diff-time deployment is com-
positionality. The idea of compositionality comes from lan-
guage semantics: a semantics is compositional if the meaning
of a complex phrase is defined in terms of the meanings of
its parts and a means of combining them. The model theory
of formal logic is typically compositional, and this idea was
emphasized in computer science prominently in Scott and
Strachey’s denotational semantics. It can be characterized
with equations of the form
[[C[M1, ..,Mn]]] = f ([[M1]], ..., [[Mn]])
and is thus similar to the concept of homomorphism, except
that syntactic facilities such as binding and higher types
1Facebook uses Phabricator: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phabricator
1 struct node* q(struct node *y) {
2 // Inferred Pre: list(y)
3 struct node *x, *z;
4 x=malloc(sizeof(struct node )); x->tail =0;
5 z=malloc(sizeof(struct node )); z->tail =0;
6 // Abduced: list(y), Framed: z|->0
7 foo(x,y); // Obtained Post: list(x)*z|->0
8 // Abduced:emp , Framed: emp
9 foo(x,z); // Obtained Post: list(x)
10 return(x);
11 // Inferred Post: list(ret)
12
13 void foo(struct node *x,struct node *y){// SUMMARY ONLY
14 // Given Pre: list(x) * list(y)
15 // Given Post: list(x)
Figure 2. Compositional Reasoning Example
going beyond universal algebra are involved. In contrast,
operational semantics is typically non-compositional.
We can transport the idea of compositionality to program
analysis and verification by substituting ‘analysis’ or ‘verifi-
cation’ for ‘meaning’. E.g.,
Compositional Analysis: an automatic program
analysis is compositional if the analysis result
of a composite program is defined in terms of
the analysis results of its parts and a means of
combining them.
A crucial point is that ‘the analysis result of a part’ is defined
(and is a meaningful concept) without having the context it
appears in: compositional analyses, by their nature, are not
reliant on a whole program.
A compositional reasoning example from the Abductor
tool [10], the academic precursor of Facebook Infer, is given
in Figure 2. Suppose we are given a pre/post pair for the
procedure foo() which says that foo takes two linked lists
occupying separate memory and returns a list (foo() might
be, say, list merge or append) . Abductor then discovers the
precondition at line 2 and the postcondition at line 13. It
does this using reasoning techniques about separation logic
[58, 63] that involve abduction and frame inference [10]2.
Apart frommechanism, the important point is that a pre/post
spec is inferred, without knowing any call sites of q().
Infer uses compositionality to provide analysis algorithms
that fit well with diff-time CI deployment. When a proce-
dure changes it can be analyzed on its own, without re-
analyzing the whole program. Infer started as a specialized
analysis based on separation logic targeting memory issues,
but evolved into an analysis framework supporting a variety
of sub-analyses, including ones for data races [5], for security
(taint) properties, and for other specialized properties. These
sub-analyses are implemented as instances of a framework
Infer.AI for building compositional abstract interpreters, all of
which support the continuous reasoning model.
2The reasoning in the example assumes, for simplicity of exposition, that
malloc() will always return a valid pointer.
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The ROFL Episode. The significance of the diff-time rea-
soning of Infer is best understood by contrast with a failure.
The first deployment was batch rather than continuous. In
this mode Infer would be run once per night, and it would
generate a list of issues. We manually looked at the issue list,
and assigned them to the developers we thought best able to
resolve the potential errors.
The response was stunning: we were greeted by near si-
lence. We assigned 20-30 issues to developers, and almost
none of them were acted on. We had worked hard to try to
get the false positive rate down, and yet the fix rate – the
proportion of reported issues that developers resolved – was
near zero. Batch deployment can be effective in some situ-
ations, but the lesson was telling. Mark Harman has even
since coined a term to describe the hole we fell into [40]:
The ROFL (Report Only Failure List) Assumption:
All an analysis needs to do is report only a fail-
ure list, with low false positives, in order to be
effective.
Let’s refer to this failed deployment for the remainder of the
paper as the ‘ROFL episode’.
Related observations on the challenges of batch mode
deployment have been made at Coverity (see slide 5 of [18]),
at Google (who exclaim ‘Bug dashboards are not the answer.’
[64]), and elsewhere.
The Human Factors Lesson. Soon after the ROFL episode
we switched Infer on at diff time. The response of engineers
was just as stunning: the fix rate rocketed to over 70%. The
same program analysis, with same false positive rate, had
much greater impact when deployed at diff time.
One problem that diff-time deployment addresses is the
mental effort of context switch. If a developer is working on
one problem, and they are confronted with a report on a
separate problem, then they must swap out the mental con-
text of the first problem and swap in the second. ROFL is
simply silent on this fundamental problem. But by partici-
pating as a bot in code review, the context switch problem is
largely solved by diff-time deployment: programmers come
to the review tool to discuss their code with human review-
ers, with mental context already swapped in. This illustrates
as well how important timeliness is: if a bot were to run for
an hour or more on a diff, instead of 10-15 minutes, it would
sometimes be too late to participate well in code review.
A second problem that diff-time deployment addresses is
relevance. When an issue is discovered in the codebase, it can
be non-trivial to assign it to the right person. In the extreme,
the issue might have been caused by somebody who has
left the company. Furthermore, even if you think you have
found someone familiar with the codebase, the issue might
not be relevant to any of their past or current work. But, if
we comment on a diff that introduces an issue then there is
a pretty good (but not perfect) chance that it is relevant.
Impact. Over the past four years, tens of thousands of issues
flagged by Infer have been fixed by Facebook developers
before reaching production.
Our earlier labelling of the ‘ROFL episode’ was admittedly
tongue-in-cheek. The continuous deployment of Infer was
always planned, and was not done in reaction to the episode
(though perhaps it was accelerated). We have since had some
successes with batch mode deployment; these will reported
on in future. But, the vast majority of Infer’s impact to this
point is attributable to continuous reasoning at diff time,
and the point is that this deployment eases a number of
difficulties, but not that that it is the only way to do so.
2.2 Scientific Context
Numerous ideas have been advanced in the research com-
munity which are relevant to continuous reasoning.
A fundamental principle of Hoare logic is its incremen-
tality: one reasons about calls to a procedure using its spec,
and not its code, and therefore a change to the code of a
procedure would not always necessitate re-proving an entire
program [42]. This principle drove the initial foundation of
Infer: the pre/post specs are computed automatically, and
then incrementality flows as in Hoare logic. In fact, a com-
plete program is not needed to verify a procedure wrt its
pre/post specs in Hoare logic style; Hoare logic is composi-
tional in this sense as well as incremental.
Pioneering work of King showed how a program could be
annotated with assertions at key points and then verification
conditions would be generated which could be discharged
by a theorem prover [47]. Many tools have been developed
over the years extending the ideas of King, and relying on
Hoare logic’s incrementality. Representative recent tools,
which have seen impressive successes in verifying challeng-
ing programs, include Dafny [52] and VST-Floyd [11]. Dafny
uses an automatic prover to discharge the verification condi-
tions derived from a procedure body and it’s pre/post spec
(plus, perhaps, loop invariants): it is an example of what is
sometimes referred to as amostly automatic verifier: ‘mostly’
because the human does the work of supplying pre/post
specs and other annotations, and then the automatic prover
takes over. VST-Floyd uses a similar overall approach, except
that an interactive theorem prover (in this case, the Coq
proof assistant) is used to discharge the verification condi-
tions. One might say that in Dafny and VST-Floyd share a
manual approach to compositionality, differing in their level
of automation for reasoning after specs have been placed,
while Infer is automatic both in its compositonality and in
its reasoning. Typically, one can prove stronger properties
as automation decreases.
In the early 2000s, Hoare proposed a grand challenge for
computing research – the verifying compiler [43] – which
evolved into the verified software initiative [45]. Hoare re-
alized that getting feedback to the programmer at compile
time could make a difference in effectiveness of signal, and
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conceived of mostly automatic verifiers being used by pro-
grammers. The Infer experience above is in a similar spirit,
except that signal happens at diff rather than compile time,
and that the human is not required to supply annotations to
drive the tool. With diff-time deployment for code review
enough time has elapsed for the tool to do significant work,
but not so much time that signal comes too late.
Turning to automatic program analysis, while the idea of
a compositional analysis is well known (e.g. [24]), it seems
fair to say that the majority of research papers in the sub-
ject focus on a whole-program setup. Typically, an analyzer
targets small intricate programs or a collection of more gen-
eral test programs, but in either case its evaluation is given
by manually examining a list of alarms (or the information
that a proof succeeded); this evokes the ROFL assumption
mentioned earlier. While this kind of work, which has often
fixated on precision for fixed (often small) programs, has
led to many important ideas, perhaps some rebalancing is
in order: more research effort might be directed towards the
problems of large, changing codebases.
Finally, ideas of analyzing the difference between two
pieces of code, and of reporting results as soon as possible,
have also been the subject of scientific papers; e.g., [32, 49].
2.3 Industry Context
Deployments similar to Infer’s implementation of continuous
reasoning have occurred in several other contexts. We begin
with one that is nearly the opposite on several dimensions.
Amazon s2n is an implementation of the Transport Level
Security protocol which is in widespread use in Amazon’s
data centers. Amazon have, in a collaboration with Galois,
proven strong security properties of key components of s2n
[19]. For example, they establish that the s2n implementa-
tion of HMAC implements a pseudorandom function. Some
salient features of their effort are as follows.
• The specifications themselves are the subject of signif-
icant design and proof work, connecting several levels
of specs by reasoning in the Coq proof assistant and
the Cryptol tool from Galois, some done in [19] and
some building on separate work [4].
• The code is small: just over 550 lines of C.
• The connection between the lowest level of Cryptol
specification and s2n’s C code is verified automatically
using the SAW tool from Galois [33]. The proof is re-
played in CI on every submitted code change.
• Pre/post specs are supplied manually, in common with
the mostly automatic verifiers, but loop invariants are
not needed because the loops are bounded. The incre-
mentality of Hoare logic means that the effects of code
changes on a proof effort can be localized.
• The specification is expected to change much less fre-
quently than the code; e.g., the top-level spec of HMAC
has changed only once since 2002.
Figure 3. Facebook versus Amazon
• Over a period of just over a year from November 2016
the proof was re-played in CI 956 times, and had to be
(manually) altered only 3 times.
Theirs is one of many proofs of small security-critical pro-
grams that have been carried out; the distinguishing feature
is how the proof is re-played in CI. The motivation they give
is that ‘verification must continue to work with low effort as
developers change the code’ [19]. That the proof had to only
be altered 3 times is perhaps the most important take-home
from the work. A fundamental challenge for full-blown verifi-
cation is the question of ongoing drag (see [40] for definition
and broader discussion), and in the worst case one could
imagine needing a verification expert sitting beside each pro-
grammer to drive the re-proof: i.e., human CI. Although the
data from the s2n work is too limited to draw broad conclu-
sions for general code, it seems clear that in some scenarios
continuous verification will require considerably less than
one verification expert per programmer.
The ways in which the Facebook and Amazon efforts differ
are striking (Figure 3). Infer emphasizes covering large code
in the millions of lines, it targets simple to state properties
(e.g, run-time errors; ‘small theorems about big code’), and it
uses fully automatic compositional reasoning. The Amazon
s2n work is for small code in the hundreds of lines, it targets
a highly nontrivial and lengthy specification (‘big theorems
about small code’), and it uses manual specification of inter-
faces to achieve incrementality. Both efforts, as it happens,
involve unchanging (or rarely changing) specifications.
Microsoft Numerous reasoning tools have been deployed
over the years at Microsoft. Two of the more prominent are
Prefix and Prefast [51]. Prefix is a global inter-procedural
analysis that scales to large code bases, but was too slow to
deploy at the analogue of diff time or code review time: it
was used in overnight runs. Prefast was a reaction to the
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challenges of Prefix. Prefast analysis is limited to a single
function. Therefore, the analysis is fast and can be run at the
same places as build; this could be the analogue of diff time in
CI, or on local machines. Prefast needs inputs and outputs to
be annotated manually by the programmer (e.g., with range
or nullness information) to deliver effective signal.
Google A recent paper explains how Google has experi-
mented with numerous static analyses [64]. Earlier, in the
context of ROFL, we mentioned how they concluded that
batch deployment producing bug lists is not effective. They
also say that ‘Code review is a sweet spot at Google for dis-
playing analysis warnings before code is committed.’ So far,
inter-procedural analysis or sophisticated, logic-based analy-
sis techniques have not been a priority at Google according to
[64]; the analyses are intra-procedural and relatively simple.
But, it is remarkable how strongly similar the conclusions
reached by Facebook and Google are on ROFL (batch) and
code review (continuous) deployments.
Altran Altran (formerly, Praxis) is a pioneer of industrial
program verification, having been in the proof-producing
business for over 20 years [14]. They developed the Spark
programming language, based on Ada, which uses a mostly
automatic verifier. Spark restricts programs to features for
which traditional Hoare logic works well (eg.: no pointers,
no concurrency), and is used in a part of industry (safety-
critical computing) that one might think of as far removed
from the ‘highmomentum’ development practices of internet
companies such as Facebook and Google.
Remarkably, a recent paper explains how verification for
safety-critical systems with Spark is compatible with Agile
engineering practices [15]. The specification of a product is
not assumed to be rarely changing. They recount one expe-
rience with software that provides information about flight
trajectories and potential conflicts to air traffic controllers in
the UK: ‘Overnight, the integration server rebuilds an entire
proof of the software, populating a persistent cache, accessible
to all developers the next morning. Working on an isolated
change, the developers can reproduce the proof of the entire
system in about 15 minutes on their desktop machines, or in a
matter of seconds for a change to a single module’.
We stress that the very notion of what we are calling con-
tinuous reasoning is not novel. The general idea is straight-
forward, and probably no attribution is necessary. More im-
portantly, there are valuable scientific principles which have
been advanced that support the general idea, and (as we
will argue) there is much more research to be done. And,
ultimately, more powerful than novelty is corroboration:
continuous reasoning is actually being practiced industrially
in several companies, who are reporting similar benefits.
2.4 Synthesis
In this paper by (diff time) continuous reasoning we mean:
Figure 4. Bug Time Spectrum
Reasoning is run on code changes, done automatically
in CI, with reporting that is timely enough to partici-
pate as a bot in code review.
What ‘timely’ means can vary from organization to organi-
zation. At Facebook we have a rule of thumb that feedback
should be reported on average in 20mins for code review.
Benefits of continuous reasoning are as follows.
1. By being run automatically in a CI system when a
programmer submits code, the programmer does not
need to consciously or actively run a tool, helping it
to scale to many programmers.
2. By focussing on fragments of code in code changes
rather than whole programs, incremental techniques
can help deliver timely feedback even for a codebase
in the many millions of lines of code being modified
by thousands of programmers.
3. By participating in code review, the tool presents feed-
back to developers in tune with their workflow, avoid-
ing the mental effort of context switch.
4. By identifying issues ‘caused’ by a code modification,
developers are much more likely than random to re-
ceive reports relevant to what they are working on.
In this paper we are focussing on diff-time continuous
reasoning, but more generally there is obviously a spectrum
running from build time to diff time to post land and later
(e.g., Figure 4). Different engineering and scientific problems
arise at each point in the spectrum, and at Facebook we are
investigating all of them. But, following on from the ROFL
episode from earlier the most common question that comes
up is: how can we move a technique to diff time from later?
3 Scientific Challenges
We want to distinguish two questions that can arise when
thinking about deploying reasoning techniques.
Question E. Suppose we were to take a current snap-
shop which effectively freezes development of new
techniques for reasoning about programs. For each
technique (e.g., BMC, CEGAR, concolic, fuzz, numeric
domains ..), where can it be effectively deployed on
the bug time spectrum?
Question S.What advances can be made in reasoning
techniques, which create a new snapshot of knowl-
edge that might (perhaps dramatically) alter answers
to Question E in the future.
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Question E is primarily an engineering one. Inputs to answer-
ing the question include: effectiveness of signal (including
but not limited to precision); resource issues such as power
and CPU time; and startup plus ongoing effort for people
(both tool developers and tool users). Long-established tech-
niques (e.g., typechecking) are as relevant to Question E as
more recent, less developed, ones; sometimes even moreso.
Answering Question E is difficult because it inherently in-
volves uncertainty: fully comprehensive data on all these
inputs across the spectrum is hard to come by. As a con-
sequence, experimentation, creativity, and judgement are
needed in approaching it.
Question S, in comparison, is primarily a scientific ques-
tion. It is the one we will concentrate on in this section.
But, it helps to keep the engineering question in mind when
formulating and studying problems related to Question S.
3.1 What should be the alarms
Given a fixed whole program and a kind of error that a global
program analyzer is attempting to find or prevent, the issue
of what should be an alarm is often straightforward: e.g.,
potential errors together with evidence (say, traces starting
from a main() function) that they can occur. This idea, while
clear enough, depends upon the
Closed World Assumption (CWA), that analyzers
apply only to complete programs.
This is to be contrasted with the
Open World Assumption (OWA), that analyzers
can apply to incomplete program fragments.
Adopting the OWA as the basis for research opens up many
applications that are difficult to approach under CWA.
But, for an OWA reasoning tool the question of what the
alarms should be is not as obvious as under CWA. Supposewe
1 void f(int *ptr){
2 *ptr = 42;
3 }
have a function like f() to
the right which immediately
dereferences a pointer. When
analyzing this function on its own, without knowing any
callers, an analyzer would be ill-advised to report a null deref-
erence at line 3; else, in analyzing any non-trivial codebase
the programmer would be flooded with spurious warnings.
Infer suppresses the potential null alarm by inferring a pre-
condition, which says that ptr holds an allocated pointer.
On the other hand, analyzers for large-scale software de-
ployments will often report issues without having a path
back all the way back to a main() function. For example,
Infer reported3 an issue in OpenSSL as follows:
apps/ca.c:2780: error: NULL_DEREFERENCE
pointer `revtm ` last assigned on line 2778
could be null and is dereferenced at line 2780, column 6
2778. revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL , 0);
2779.
2780. i = revtm ->length + 1;
3https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3403&user=guest&pass=guest
Infer finds a trace with 36 steps before a potential return
of NULL is encountered in the call to X509_gmtime_adj()4.
However, Infer does not know that the specific call at line
2778will return NULL in some actual run of a program. Rather,
it fails to synthesize a precondition ruling out NULL and uses
this failure, together with some reporting heuristics which
involve the source of NULL, to decide to raise an alarm. In
fact, Infer makes this report on fragments of OpenSSL that
are not even placed in a running context (there is no main()).
(Note that this discussion is not about null pointers per se;
issues of reporting without a trace to main(), and also of
filtering alarms to reduce false positives, arise with array
bounds errors, data races, and many other runtime errors,
when we do not make the monolithic system assumption.)
What are we to make of this from a scientific point of
view? One possible reaction is to say that Infer, Prefix, the
offering from Coverity, and other analyzers running on large-
scale code are simply heuristic: they do reasoning, but fall
back on ad hoc heuristics when deciding what to raise as an
alarm, or even what paths to explore.
Another reaction is to say we should only surface ‘purely
local alarms’, ones that we know will arise in any evaluation
of a function; a kind of mini-CWA. This would simply miss
too many bugs, and would therefore give up impact, though
how many missed varies from category to category. For
example, we have observed very many local memory and
resource leak errors reported by Infer; memory or a resource
is allocated and then it is freed along a main execution path
within a function, but the programmer forgets to free on
an exceptional path. On the other hand, extremely few null
dereference errors or information flow alarms raised by Infer
have been purely local in this sense.
A final reaction, the one that we prefer, is to think that
there is possibly something to understand here. Industrial
deployments have gone beyond the usual assumptions of the
scientific field, something that is expected and natural when
science and industrial engineering bump into one another.
This presents an opportunity to the scientist to re-examine
assumptions and, consequently, provide a better basis for
the engineering of reasoning tools in the future.
One idea that occurs is that any alarm-surfacing strategy
be paired with a code transformation that closes the program
with surrounding code that ‘explains’ the error reports. A
tool would not literally complete the code, but this would
be part of the conceptual explanation of the alarms. Note
that one is not looking for, say, a most general in some sense
surrounding program, but one that helps understand, judge
and guide analyzer choices.
Whether this speculation or any other ideas bear fruit in
explaining alarms remains to be seen. In any case, we want to
stress to the reader that the task of deciding what the alarms
should be is a very important one faced when designing an
4www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/p.ohearn/InterproceduralBlog/openssl_trace.txt.
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New issues only New+Old issues
Changed Files Lean Bulky
All Files Cautious Clean
Table 1. Reporting Modes
analyzer to be used by people rather than for the purpose of
experiments, especially for analysis of large-scale codebases.
In our experience the science of reasoning about programs
does not yet provide much guidance in this important task.
3.2 What and when to report
As mentioned in Section 2.1, the ROFL assumption would
have it that all a reasoning tool needs to do is report a list
of alarms. But we also saw there than when the alarm is
reported has a large effect on whether the signal is effective.
Table 1 lists some of the reporting possibilities.
• Lean reporting of only new errors only on changed
files is Infer’s default at diff time. It is a low friction
deployment: it avoids reporting pre-existing issues to
an author of a diff, which typically will not be relevant
to the diff. It supports the first axiom of industrial static
analysis: Don’t spam the developer.
• Bulky reporting can, when run on a large legacy code-
base, result in numerous pre-existing issues being re-
ported. Sometimes these can be overwhelming, and
irrelevant to the diff author, so care is needed in this
reporting mode. (With Infer, we are experimenting
with it for certain bug types and certain projects.)
• Cautious fits well with periodic global analyzer runs
on an entire codebase, as opposed to at diff time. It has
been used by Coverity [18], and versions of it are used
for both static and dynamic analysis at Facebook.
• Clean is used for deployments that seek to keep a code-
base entirely free of certain issues. The Amazon s2n
effort uses this deployment, Infer has used it with the
source code of the Buck build system, and it is com-
monly used with type systems.
Of the dimensions in Table 1, focussing on changed files is
somewhat arbitrary; it is what we do with Facebook Infer
currently, but one could equally choose the granularity of
changed lines, procedures, or even build targets. The new-
versus-old dimension has some subtleties, in that identifying
a ‘new’ issue can be challenging in the face of refactoring or
code moves. Also, there is more than one way to identify ‘old’
issues (e.g., by running on base as well as parent commits,
or by keeping a database of known issues), and they are not
equivalent. Identifying new issues could itself be the subject
of theoretical definitions and experimental analysis.
In this discussion we are taking ‘report’ to mean an active
indication to a programmer of an issue. This could, say, be
a comment on a diff (in Lean reporting) or an email to an
individual in a post-land deployment (Cautious). A report is
like a push notification. Producing a passive bug list which
programmers can optionally browse is also useful, but is
intended not to disturb programmers.
We are not proposing any deep scientific questions on
reporting modes. Rather, having these distinctions in mind
is useful for framing other questions.
3.3 Automatic Program Analysis
In this section we discuss challenges for automatic program
analysis of large codebases at diff time. Our focus is mainly
on compositional and incremental techniques.
Compositionality and Incrementality, Intuitive Basis
Compositional program analysis helps scale a reasoning tech-
nique to large codebases and it naturally supports diff-time
continuous reasoning. The intuition for scalability is that
each procedure (or unit of modularity, such as a class) only
needs (ignoring recursion) to be visited once by a compo-
sitional analysis, and furthermore that many of the proce-
dures in a codebase can often be analyzed independently,
thus opening up opportunities for parallelism. Therefore, if
we knew a bound on the time to analyze each procedure
(or if we imposed one) then the analysis time would be an
additive linear combination.
Dealing exhaustively with code pointers or with recursion,
which causes a procedure to be visited multiple times if a
fixed-point is to be sought, can complicate this basic intu-
ition. But they do not completely undermine it. Recursion
cycles can be arbitrary broken pragmatically if they are too
large, while still obtaining useful results, and alarm-surfacing
decisions can mitigate the precision effects of unknown code
pointers. In applications it is useful to start from an analysis
that scales to large code because of the additivity intuition
above, with appropriate mitigations in place, rather than
start from one that does not scale. Then one can achieve
non-zero impact early, followed by iterative improvement in
reaction to developer feedback and other data.
Compositional techniques naturally lend themselves to
incremental algorithms, where changing a small part of code
requires only re-analyzing that code (or that code plus not too
much more). The reporting model, as in Table 1, has a signif-
icant effect, though. If alarms are reported only on changed
files, then only those files plus procedures transitively called
from them need to be re-analyzed; and if summaries for the
transitive dependents are in cache, their analysis can (mod-
ulo mutual recursion) be avoided too. However, if all alarms
are to be reported, then it might be necessary to analyze
many files other than those that have changed.
Technical Challenge Although compositional static anal-
yses exist [24], the area is extremely under-developed. Valu-
able reasoning techniques such as interpolation, abstraction
refinement, and various numerical abstract domains have
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been mostly studied in the context of whole-program analy-
sis. This leads to to the following challenge.
Automatic Compositionality Challenge. For each
program reasoning technique – e.g., BMC [21],
CEGAR [20], interpolation [55], symbolic and
concolic testing [6], fuzz [56], SBSE testing [54],
numeric abstract domains [26] – formulate an
automatic compositional variant.
• Demonstrate experimentally and explain the-
oretically its scalability to large codebases (mil-
lions of LOC).
• Demonstrate experimentally and explain theo-
retically per-diff scalability, where running time
is proportional to the size of a code change and
not an entire codebase; or document assump-
tions sufficient for such incremental scalability.
• Demonstrate effective signal.
Let us discuss the demonstrations the challenge asks for.
Concerning scaling to large code, consider (for example)
that: (i) The celebrated ASTREE analyzer [26], which in-
cludes sophisticated numeric domains as well as techniques
to balance precision and speed, verified the absence of run-
time errors in 400k lines of C code in a run of over 11 hours5;
(ii) The SLAM tool, which represented a leading example of
CEGAR in action, sometimes timed out (ran for more than
2000 seconds) on device drivers in the low 10k’s LOC [3];
(iii) the CBMC tool [21], a leading bounded model checker,
has been reported as running for over a day on 100k LOC
programs [17]. In fact, according to Daniel Kroening (per-
sonal communication): ‘CBMC isn’t designed to scale (simply
since SAT isn’t designed to scale).’
On the other hand, if we think of the jump from Space
Invader [68] to Abductor [10] – from 10k LOC (and timing
out due to memory exhaustion on slightly larger programs)
to 2.4M LOC in 2 hours – then we might hope for these and
other techniques to scale to a much higher degree. As an
indication of potential, were there a tool for precise numer-
ical program analysis, in the spirit of ASTRÉE but able to
deliver fast results on codemods to a 10MLOC codebase, then
it could prove useful. Admittedly, this is not necessarily an
easy goal.
Concerning incrementality, several of the techniques men-
tioned in the challenge have been married with summary-
based inter-procedural program analysis [61]. This gives a
potential route to explore the diff scalability requirement. In
fact, there have been many non-compositional, summary-
based program analyses, which start from a main() function
and use summaries only to enhance scalability, not to com-
pute specs in a context-independent way: compositionality is
not necessary to incrementality. Compositionality allows to
5We will quote any running times in this paper with the understanding that
they refer to the ‘hardware of the time’; in none of the cases is the detail of
that hardware very pertinent to the point being made
analyze incomplete code (such as checking a class for poten-
tial thread safety errors, future-proofing it before it is placed
into a concurrent context), but this is an additional capabil-
ity over the incrementality that is needed to support diff-
time analysis. Deploying whole-program, non-compositonal,
summary-based analyses at diff time is an obvious idea to
try, but not one that we are aware has been explored.
There are also some relevant works on compositional (and
not just incremental) analysis. For instance, [65] describes
a way of inferring preconditions which fits together with
CEGAR and predicate abstraction, while [25] does so for a
numerical abstract domain. In short, there are good starting
points for investigating the global and per-diff scalability
requirements in the challenge.
Concerning effective signal, this is the least clear part of
the challenge. The mentioned techniques have been mostly
developed in a whole-program setup, and so answers to the
question of what alarms to raise have been (unconsciously,
perhaps) driven by the Closed World Assumption. We leave
this part of the challenge underspecified, hoping that re-
searchers will use such concepts as false positive rate, fix
rate, alarm volume, or even fresh ideas to address it. See [40]
for further discussion on effective signal.
Care in comparison: OWA versus CWA. It is tempting
when comparing techniques to, unintentionally, focus on
dimensions that are the home turf of one but not the other.
We therefore offer remarks on the relation between closed
and open world techniques, which reflect conversations we
have had with scientific researchers and industrial engineers
in analysis over the past several years.
First, it is important to remember that developing com-
positional versions of any of the techniques (interpolation,
CEGAR, etc) mentioned in the challenge could necessitate
new answers to the question ‘what are the alarms’. The resul-
tant alarms would then need to be evaluated for the fidelity
of the signal that they provide. So, if we were to try to com-
pare compositional (open world) and whole-program (closed
world) versions of a technique, even ones that used the same
abstract domain, it might not be an apples-to-apples compar-
ison if the decisions on what should be alarms are different.
This remark about not being apples-to-apples applies to
proof as well as to alarm surfacing. An example is again in
the comparison of Space Invader [68] and Abductor [10],
tools that use the same abstract domain but differ in their
approach to summaries. Space Invader was able to prove
pointer safety of a 10k LOCWindows device driver (the IEEE
1394 Firewire driver). The proof used a ‘verification harness’,
a fake main() function that called the dispatch routines of
the driver repeatedly after non-deterministically allocating
representative data structures accessed by the driver. Abduc-
tor, applied to the same driver without the harness, was able
to find specifications for all 121 functions in its code. But,
one of the preconditions discovered was overly specific, and
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Abductor could not complete the verification when the har-
ness was added to the code. So, Space Invader was superior
to Abductor when it came to complete proof of absence of
pointer errors in small (10k LOC) programs, and it resulted in
more that 40 memory safety bugs being fixed in a Microsoft
driver. On the other hand, Abductor could scale to millions
of LOC and it supported per-diff incrementality. These latter
features were eventually used in Infer at Facebook, and led
to much greater impact.
An important lesson is that it is incorrect to view compo-
sitional algorithms as merely optimized versions of slower
global algorithms in a CWA scenario: the compositional algo-
rithm may embrace the Open World Assumption, and might
therefore answer different questions. A second lesson is that,
if the compositional algorithm is less precise (under CWA)
than the global one, we should not therefore conclude that
the compositional algorithm is not up to standard. If you
have two algorithms, one with a great deal more impact than
the other, you shouldn’t blame the more impactful algorithm
for not matching the less impactful one; if either algorithm
needs to have its raison d’être explained, it’s the less impact-
ful one. (This discussion calls to mind Vardi’s principle: ‘the
brainiac often loses to the speed demon’.)
Dynamic and Bounding For over-approximating static
techniques it would be useful to look at bounding variants
(say, limiting the number of times recursion cycles are tra-
versed) while measuring quantities such as alarms/minute, to
quantify the benefit of reaching a fixed-point. This is not to
suggest that the fixed-point should be avoided; rather, some
alarms might be delivered early, at diff time, while others (or
the announcement ‘proof’) could wait for a post-land run.
The techniques mentioned in the Compositionality Chal-
lenge include ones from dynamic as well as static program
analysis. For bounded and under-approximate methods, the
potential to be unlocked by diff-time reporting is possibly
even greater, because techniques such as fuzz, concolic, and
bounded model checking are often considered in the time-
consumig category, which can take hours of running time to
achieve much code coverage on large codebases. It is possi-
ble to run an analysis for a shorter time by exploring fewer
paths, so genuinely answering this challenge should involve
metrics such as code coverage or alarms/min which indicate
that speedups are not obtained only by delivering less.
One promising direction for work here involves mixing
static and dynamic analysis. Indeed, there have been works
that transport the concept of procedure summary from static
analysis to testing and bounded model checking [17, 38, 39]6:
these have been used to approach the global rather than the
6Note that these works are using the term ‘compositional’ for what we
would call a whole-program, non-compositional, summary-based analysis.
They use summaries to avoid repeating computations, but require a (whole)
program to run and thus do not give meaning to ‘the analysis result of a part’
independently of the whole, as the traditional notion of compositionality
from language semantics would require. This is only a terminological point,
incremental-on-code-mode scalability question, but there is a
very real prospect of increasing their impact if the techniques
can be used for effective incremental diff-time reporting. For
example, if a tool were to run for hours or overnight to obtain
procedure summaries for a large codebase, but it was possible
to get quick results on diffs by re-using cached summaries for
unchanged code parts, then the impact of all these techniques
could be raised. Further work in this direction could turn
out to be very worthwhile.
There have even been automatic dynamic analyzes that
attempt to analyze code fragments. One of the leading works
in the area runs on a procedure in isolation from its call sites
and uses a technique called ‘lazy initialization’ to build a
description of a needed data structure [60]. In this respect
it is similar to the precondition inference of Infer; see [9].
It also runs into the problem of Section 3.1, on what the
alarms should be. They report good results on memory leak
errors on one project (BIND), but have many false positives
(over 70% and even 90%) for other bug types and other code.
Generally speaking, the technical and conceptual challenges
of dynamic analysis for incomplete code fragments are great,
but progress in the area could be useful.
On Higher Order and Unknown Code Consider the code
1 void h(int **goo ()){
2 int *ptr;
3 ptr = *goo();
4 *ptr = 42;
5 }
for the function h() to the
right. How can we reason
about this using static analysis,
in particular to know whether
to report a null dereference for either of the dereferences? A
typical approach is to say that first one runs a global alias
analysis which collects all of the potential targets of the call
*goo(), before reasoning about them. But this relies on CWA.
Code pointers are a fundamental problem under OWA.
A compromise is used by Infer. When Infer sees a deref-
erence that it does not know to be safe, it abduces an as-
sumption of non-nullness and attempts to re-express the
assumption using data from the function’s pre-state. At line
3 we abduce that goo should not be null to avoid a null
dereference, and this becomes part of the function’s inferred
precondition. At line 4 we abduce that ptr should not be
null, and we can recognize that this in effect means that the
call to *goo at line 3 should not return null. In effect, we ab-
duce an angelic assumption about the behaviour of *goo(),
suppressing a potential null dereference alarm at line 4.
This issue is similar for any kind of unknown code, and
not just parameters that are code pointers.
Angelic reasoning [27], as about *goo() above, helps
avoid spamming developers with reports about unknown
code. While useful, it is not always the right solution. Where
Infer makes angelic assumptions when reasoning about null
pointers, it makes demonic assumptions in other cases such
and we make it only to avoid confusion: the results in these papers are very
valuable independently of terminological matters.
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as when reasoning about thread safety of Java classes. Blan-
ket angelic or demonic assumptions about unknown code can
be useful for making engineering compromises, but neither
provides a general solution to the problem of compositional
reasoning about code pointers under OWA.
An interesting idea is, instead of inferring an assertion
expressing a blanket assumption, to try to abduce more ex-
pressive specifications (such as pre/post specs) about how
unknown code should behave [1, 37]. In addition to hav-
ing more expressive potential, this direction might lead to
greater parallelism and incrementality in an analysis.
Note that the issues here are are problematic even for
tools where the programmer is asked to manually insert
specifications, as pointed out in this remark by Chlipapa:
‘Verifications based on automated theorem prov-
ing have omitted reasoning about first-class code
pointers, which is critical for tasks like certifying
implementations of threads and processes.’ [16]
The response of researchers in interactive verification has
been to use higher order logic, in a verification analogue of
the use of higher types in the account of data abstraction [62].
This suggests another research problem: develop abstract
domains that utilize higher order logic, and demonstrate how
they can be used to reason fully automatically about first
class code pointers under OWA.
3.4 Mostly Automatic and Interactive Verifiers
Impressive advances have been made in mechanized verifi-
cation in recent years. We have seen example verifications
of OS microkernels [48, 67], a file system [13], crypto algo-
rithms [4] and distributed systems [41]. Some of this work
develops the program and the proof side by side, while other
work proves existing code. It is now feasible, in (say) several
person years or even months, to prove functional correctness
properties of programs in the range of 10k LOC.
This is a remarkable situation to have gotten to. But ...
now what? Will it be possible for full verification to scale to
many more programs and programmers? Or will and should
verification be an activity reserved for a tiny proportion of
the great many programs in the world? While we don’t have
answers to these questions, it is well to additionally ask:
what are the main impediments to scale?
The expertise bottleneck A fundamental bottleneck is the
level of expertise needed to drive a tool. Some leading propo-
nents of the mostly automatic approach have put it starkly:
‘The quality of feedback produced by most veri-
fication tools makes it virtually impossible to use
them without an extensive background in formal
methods [53].’
And if this is an issue for mostly automatic verification, it is
likely moreso for interactive.
One reaction to this problem is to restrict attention to spec-
ifications of (much) less than full correctness, for example
by supporting simple annotations that are more like types.
This approach has been extraordinarily successful and will
likely continue to be. Having accepted this point, let’s move
on to consider reactions to the problem that maintain the
focus on full functional verification.
Another reaction is that we should grow the collection
of people who are experts in formal methods. This reaction
has its merits, and education should certainly be a priority. It
would be wishful thinking to hope that all programmers will
become formal methods experts any time soon, but growing
the community can still be positive.
The third reaction is that we should strive to make the
tools more usable. Partly, this is a tool engineering problem
(quality of feedback), but there are scientific aspects as well.
Advances in program logic (e.g., [46, 59, 63]) have led to
simpler ways to specify programs, and advances in theorem
proving (e.g., [28, 29]) can lead to greater automation.
The specs bottleneck Much research in verification pro-
ceeds from the assumption: the formal specifications are
given. But, specifications are non-trivial to come by. Cre-
ating a formal specification is time consuming, and people
need to be convinced that the value obtained is worth the
effort put in. Even if we had perfect, push button verifiers,
mostly automatic tools would still be non-trivial to deploy
to large programming populations.
It is hard to know whether the expertise or specs bottle-
neck is the greater problem for scaling (likely, they are not
independent). But in discussions we have often observed
questions about the need for specs being expressed well
prior to discussion of the detailed tools. This can be taken as
providing motivation for technical research.
The ‘where do we get specs’ question suggests further
research in guessing specs from dynamic information [2, 34,
66], as aiding the human’s specification-making activity. Re-
latedly, further integration of verifiers with static program
analyses, which can sometimes infer the intermediate specifi-
cations (including pre/post specs) needed to make a proof go
through, could limit the number of annotations that the pro-
gramer needs to place, or even suggest such specifications
to the programmers [12]. Finally, there is a frustrating du-
plication of effort in writing tests and writing specifications;
unification of these activities could be valuable.
Engineering principles for proof Proofs as engineering
artifacts raise similar problems to those which motivated
abstraction and modularity in software design. For example,
if proofs have sufficient modularity, then it stands to reason
that a small changes to code is less likely to necessitate global
changes to a proof than if proofs are monolithic.
Suppose that a verified program changes. If re-proof fail-
ure uncovers an error, with actionable information, then the
verifier provides benefit. If a human expert needs to update
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the proof when the code continues to satisfy the top-level
specification, then this is like a false positive. The less human
interaction is needed to update a proof, the easier it is for
verification to be used by more programmers.
It is important to note, though, that there is no need to
wish that verification technology becomes so easy to use that
deployment doesn’t need to be supported by subject-matter
experts. Often, when a technology is deployed, ongoing sup-
port is required. This is true for programming languages,
build systems, and automatic program analyzers. We want
to minimize the number of experts needed, which is not to
say eliminate them. So, even if experts need to be on hand
occasionally to help with a proof, if we can drive down the
ratio of formal methods specialists to programmers, then we
can more easily support a greater number of programmers.
These directions suggest fundamental work aimed at sim-
plicity, increased automation, abstraction and modularity of
specs and proofs. One small suggestion is that research pa-
pers might usefully address the question of effort to update a
proof when code changes, in addition to the effort to produce
one in the first place. We are not proposing revolutionary
advance here, but rather continued steady improvement.
3.5 Abstract Theory for an Open World
Concepts from programming theory – including semantics
(compositionality), Hoare logic (incrementality of procedure
call rules) separation logic (frames and footprints), and ab-
stract interpretation (approximation) – have played a role
in influencing program analyzers for continuous reasoning
about large codebases. But, our experience is that the engi-
neering of such tools is running into problems that theory
does not much help with.
• How to design a notion of summary to support effec-
tive analysis under the openworld assumption (OWA)?
• How to resolve the tension between needing to infer a
concise summary and code fragments where logically
no best spec exists ?
• What should the alarms be, and how can the choice
be justified?
• What general assumptions are needed for global and
per-diff scalability?
These considerations suggest opportunities for science.
Develop a general program analysis framework, in the
spirit of abstract interpretation [23], which embraces
OWA. It should
(i) include a general notion of summary, which does
not specify their form (e.g., input/output pairs) in
advance, but that accounts for creation and instanti-
ation of summaries;
(ii) formulate its notion of summary in general terms
which allow the choice of a ‘unit of modularity’ such
as a function, a class, or a process;
(iii) include an account of the frame problem (locality)
for summaries, and independence between analysis
of program parts;
(iv) include a notion of alarm (not just over and under
approximations), and ways to justify (understand)
the alarms;
(v) include theorems related to scalability which explain
the practice of existing observably-scalable OWA
analyses and suggest future ones.
Concerning (i), frameworks for global inter-procedural anal-
ysis have been developed, but typically the summaries take
a special form (such as based on tabulation of input/output
pairs, [61]). Part of the art of designing a compositional anal-
ysis is choosing the notion of summary, and often the good
choice is not simply a tabulation of pairs [69]. Possibly, a
theory should view summaries as abstract (in the sense of
abstract algebra), their structure not specified in advance.
Summary instantiation is an area where bugs can easily
arise in design of inter-procedural analysis. This parallels
the experience with procedures in Hoare logic, where it was
reported that bugs in proof rules occurred with regularity
[22]. Also, precision questions could be studied, related to the
concept of adaptation completeness in Hoare logic [57]. Gen-
erally speaking, theory surrounding summaries, parameters,
and summary instantiation would be helpful.
Concerning (ii), summaries are not for procedures only.
Concerning (iii), in order for reasoning to scale, it is often
desirable to ensure that summaries be concise [69], and that
the abstract states describe localized pieces of memory. These
desiderata are related to the frame problem from artificial
intelligence, and to the local reasoning idea from separation
logic [58]. Related ideas have been used in a semi-formal
way in many specialized program analyses (e.g. [30], and the
RacerD and Quandary instantiations of Infer.AI).
A paper of Cousot and Cousot [24] from 2002 presents a
framework for compositional analysis. It does not address
how to obtain summaries, or how to instantiate them, but
it gives a very clean formulation of what it means for an
abstract interpretation to be compositional. The paper identi-
fies crucial issues to dowith the independence of the separate
analysis of the components, which is connected to the effi-
ciency of the ‘means to combine them’ part of compositional-
ity. The intervening years have seen many advances related
to independence, as well as to the means of combination.
For example, separation logic provides primitives for ex-
pressing independence, and bi-abduction [10] implements
a means of combining which takes (partial) independence
into account. For another example, the Views theory [31]
provides a framework for compositional reasoning about
concurrency, which one might hope could be transported
to a theory of summaries and their independence and in-
stantiation. And for yet another, in recent work Hoare and
colleagues have been investigating an algebraic theory of
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concurrency which identifies modularity principles for con-
current processes related to separation logic, but based on
separation of processes rather than states [44]. The theory is
very abstract, in that it does not say what kinds of entities the
processes are; they are just elements of an algebra (subject to
axioms). Perhaps there is an abstract algebra of summaries
and their independence to be discovered.
It may be that the time is ripe to revisit or extend the ideas
of [24], in light of the theoretical and practical developments
that have occurred since 2002.
Finally, concerning (iv) and (v), these problems could well
be more challenging than the others, but our earlier dis-
cussions should make clear their relevance to the task of
designing an OWA program analysis which can operate at
diff time for large code.
Of course, not all of (i)-(v) need to be addressed in one go.
4 Conclusion
I moved to industry just under five years ago with the acquisi-
tion by Facebook of the formal reasoning startup Monoidics,
after spending over 20 years in academic positions mostly
doing theoretical computer science. I’ve learnt many lessons
in those five years, but two stand out.
One is the importance of scale: Scale in terms of code sizes
and other resources, but even moreso in terms of people.
In Facebook Engineering we are always on the lookout for
techniques where deploying them to 10x people takes appre-
ciably less that 10x in CPU time, watts and other resources
... but especially in terms of the ongoing effort needed by
engineers (people) to maintain the technique. For example, if
a static analysis team of size 10 supports 1000 product engi-
neers, we wouldn’t want to need 100 static analysis experts
if the product engineering population were to grow to 10000.
The other lesson is the importance of integration with pro-
grammer workflow. A guiding principle: we want reasoning
tools to serve people, not the other way around.
Of course, I had heard repeatedly about scale andworkflow
integration, but I did not really appreciate their significance
back when I was a theorist. It all came together clearly for me
in continuous reasoning. The continuous deployment of Infer
showed striking benefits, in terms of developers responding
to analyzer warnings, compared to the batch deployment.
And the continuous deployment naturally supports scaling
in terms of people. Scaling in terms of power or code sizes
or other computing resources is still a hard problem, but one
that is made a little easier by compositionality.
Reasoning about programs has come a long way since
Hoare’s grand challenge 15 years ago [43, 45], I daresay sur-
prisingly far to those of us that were involved in discussions
surrounding it. But there is still a long way to go for for-
mal reasoning to have deep impact for many programmers.
Certainly there are plenty of problems to work on, only
one of which is continuous reasoning, but it is the problem
that I have personally observed which, were progress to be
made, seems like it could help further scale the impact of
formal methods. I have described outstanding challenges in
this paper, some more and others less precise, to give an
idea of work that could be done, but my real hope is that
if researchers engage with these issues they will be able to
formulate better questions as well as answers over time.
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